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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Less than two years after Massachusetts’ 2006 reform law went into effect, only 2.6 percent of residents were unin-
sured – the lowest proportion ever recorded by an American state. Fully 56 percent of the state’s increase in coverage 
took place through Medicaid and Commonwealth Care (CommCare), the state’s new subsidy program for uninsured 
adults with incomes at or below 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). 
By itself, the state’s well-known individual mandate does not explain this result since it is not enforced against adults 
with incomes at or below 150 percent FPL and does not apply to children. And while Massachusetts generously subsi-
dizes low-income residents to enroll in comprehensive coverage, the same is true of many other programs that have 
reached a much smaller proportion of eligible, low-income consumers. 
Based on interviews with policymakers, stakeholders, advocates, and others, as well as a review of published reports, 
we find that the following factors have played a central role in helping Massachusetts enroll so many eligible, low-
income uninsured: 
• Data-driven eligibility. When data available from the state’s 
previous Uncompensated Care Pool (UCP) showed that unin-
sured individuals qualified for CommCare, they were automati-
cally “converted” to CommCare coverage, without any need to 
submit new applications. By June 2007 (eight months into the 
new program), such “auto-converted” members represented 
more than 80 percent of CommCare participants. By December 
2007, former UCP enrollees, most of whom were presumably au-
to-converted to CommCare, numbered nearly 100,000 out of 
158,000 CommCare members, or roughly a quarter of all newly 
insured state residents. 
• An integrated eligibility system that serves multiple pro-
grams. A single application is used for Medicaid, CommCare, the 
UCP, and other subsidy programs. The form is processed by a 
single statewide unit within the Medicaid agency, using auto-
mated procedures to determine eligibility. As a result, consum-
ers submit just one application to learn the program for which 
they qualify; they are not required to go from agency to agency, 
submitting multiple applications until they find the right pro-
gram.  
• Health care providers and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) completing application forms on behalf of consum-
ers. Through the state’s “Virtual Gateway,” trained and depu-
tized staff from these agencies complete application forms on-
line. As consumers’ authorized representatives, the agencies re-
ceive copies of state requests for additional documentation 
needed to establish eligibility. This lets them educate consumers 
about applicable procedural requirements and ensure necessary 
follow-through.  
The state denies providers full reimbursement when a patient does not fully complete the application for health 
coverage. As a result, safety-net hospitals and community health centers devote significant staff resources to 
completing applications for patients through the Gateway and ensuring that patients follow-up as needed. In addi-
tion, CBOs have received “mini-grants,” totaling $2.5 to $3.5 million a year from the state, plus additional amounts 
from foundations, enabling these organizations to educate consumers and enroll them into coverage.  
 
KEY FINDINGS
 
• Less than two years after 
Massachusetts passed reform 
legislation, more than 97 percent 
of state residents were insured. 
 
• Within 15 months after 
implementation began, roughly 
one out of four newly insured state 
residents received subsidized 
coverage based on state data about 
household income, without any 
need to file traditional application 
forms. 
 
• A single application form and a 
single system of eligibility 
determination served multiple 
subsidy programs, making 
enrollment simple and seamless 
for consumers. 
 
• More than half of all successful 
applications for subsidized 
coverage were completed for 
consumers by community-based 
organizations and health care 
providers. 
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As a result of these combined factors (the Virtual Gateway, incentives for providers to complete applications on 
behalf of their patients, and mini-grants to CBOs to help people enroll), more than half of all successful Medicaid 
and CommCare applications since the 2006 reforms have come via the Virtual Gateway. Between this system for 
application assistance and the above-described data-driven eligibility, most uninsured residents enrolling in Medica-
id and CommCare had their eligibility determined without the consumers needing to fill out application forms.  
• An intensive public education campaign.  State residents were informed about both new assistance and the 
individual mandate through a multi-faceted public education campaign. Low-income households, whose members 
may not have understood that they were effectively exempt, worried about possible sanctions and therefore paid 
great attention to health coverage, which helped increase enrollment into Medicaid and CommCare. 
While quickly achieving high levels of program participation, the state’s approach to eligibility determination also cut 
administrative costs.  The state did not need to process new applications for people who qualified for CommCare 
based on data from the UCP; CBOs and safety-net providers implemented patient education and key-data-entry func-
tions that, in a less innovative program, would be performed by publicly funded social-service-office staff; applications 
submitted by trained CBO and provider staff via the Virtual Gateway, which incorporates automatic checks to spot 
problems and require corrections, had many fewer errors and were therefore less costly to process than applications 
directly submitted by consumers; and compared to traditional administrative procedures, a single statewide office 
determining eligibility used less labor-intensive methods to process applications while achieving economies of scale.  
As health reform is considered at the federal and state levels, policymakers wishing to enroll large proportions of the 
low-income uninsured into subsidized coverage may wish to consider policies like those used by Massachusetts, in-
cluding the following components:  
• Whenever possible, eligibility for subsidies could be determined based on available data, without requiring unne-
cessary application forms. Such data could include information on tax returns, which are filed for more than six 
out of seven uninsured Americans (86.3 percent). 
• Eligibility for all subsidy programs (including Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and any new 
subsidies established by reform legislation) could be decided by an integrated eligibility system that uses a single, 
common application form. The form could be processed by either one government agency or several agencies 
working in coordination. With both of these approaches, an integrated system would ensure that, after consumers 
file a single form, they are placed in the appropriate program without any need to submit additional applications. 
• Trained community- and provider-based staff could provide hands-on application assistance using a single online 
application system for all subsidy programs. Providers and CBOs could be given grants or financial incentives to 
successfully complete applications on behalf of low-income consumers. 
• An individual mandate could be widely publicized, along with information about available subsidies.  
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The Secrets of Massachusetts’ Success: 
Why 97 Percent of State Residents Have Health Cov-
erage 
 INTRODUCTION 
By the summer of 2008—less than two years after Mas-
sachusetts’ health care reform law became effective—
only 2.6 percent of Massachusetts residents were unin-
sured (Long, Cook and Stockley 2008). This was the low-
est proportion ever recorded in an American state.  
The state’s gains in coverage were particularly large for 
adults with incomes low enough to qualify for subsidies 
– that is, at or below 300 percent of the federal poverty 
level (FPL).1 For them, the percentage without coverage 
dropped from 23.8 percent in 2006 to just 7.6 percent in 
2008 (Long and Stockley 2009).  
How did the state accomplish this result? The usual ex-
planations are insufficient. The state mandates insur-
ance coverage for adults, but the mandate does not apply 
to children and is not enforced against adults with in-
comes below 150 percent FPL. These two groups 
represent nearly half of the increase in coverage since 
2006, as we discuss below.  
The state provides hefty subsidies for uninsured resi-
dents with low incomes, but other states have taken sim-
ilar steps without achieving remotely comparable partic-
ipation by eligible households (Maine School of Public 
Service Institute for Health Policy 2006). To borrow the 
familiar “Field of Dreams” cliché, other states built sys-
tems of health coverage subsidies, but the uninsured 
didn’t come. How did Massachusetts get them to come?  
Based on state administrative data, a review of existing 
studies, a site visit to Boston in July 2009, and follow-up 
interviews, this report explains the innovative adminis-
trative strategies that caused an unprecedented propor-
tion of eligible, low-income residents to participate in 
Massachusetts’ subsidized health coverage programs.   
National policymakers structuring health reform legisla-
tion have already learned much from Massachusetts’ 
groundbreaking efforts. Key features of both Massachu-
setts reform and proposed national legislation include 
generous subsidies for uninsured residents with in-
comes too high to qualify for Medicaid but too low to 
afford coverage on their own, an individual mandate to 
purchase coverage whenever it is affordable, and a 
health insurance “exchange” in which consumers can 
choose from among competing plans.2  
But none of these well-known policies, either alone or in 
combination, would have yielded the state’s extraordi-
nary results placing the low-income uninsured into sub-
sidized health coverage. Innovative outreach and 
enrollment strategies, which this paper describes for the 
first time to a national audience, also played a central 
role. For future reforms at either the national or state 
level to accomplish the basic objective of enrolling the 
low-income uninsured into health insurance, it will be 
important to incorporate these additional lessons from 
Massachusetts into the design of coverage expansion.3 
This study was completed under a grant from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation’s State Health Access Reform 
Evaluation (SHARE) initiative. 
  I. AN OVERVIEW OF MASSACHUSETTS REFORMS 
Massachusetts’ reform legislation was signed into law in 
April 2006. For purposes of this report, the most impor-
tant elements of the new policy involve subsidies, the 
individual mandate, and reimbursement for uncompen-
sated care. After describing key features of the 2006 
Massachusetts reforms,4 this section of our paper identi-
fies some of the major dates in the state’s implementa-
tion of the new law. 
Subsidies  
• The 2006 legislation extends coverage of children 
through Medicaid (dubbed “MassHealth” in Massa-
chusetts) to 300 percent FPL. Before the bill, eligibil-
ity stopped at 200 percent FPL.5  
• A new subsidy program, Commonwealth Care 
(CommCare), provides comprehensive benefits to 
adults who are ineligible for Medicaid and whose in-
comes are at or below 300 percent FPL.  Beneficia-
ries include poor adults who fell outside the state’s 
previous categories for adult Medicaid eligibility. 
CommCare members with incomes below 100 per-
cent FPL were not charged premiums initially; later, 
that threshold was raised to 150 percent FPL. Be-
tween the “zero-premium” income threshold and 
300 percent FPL, premiums are charged on a sliding 
scale, based on income.  
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• A newly created, independent state agency known 
as the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector 
Authority (“Connector”) administers CommCare as 
well as certain other aspects of the reform law. 
• Both Medicaid and CommCare provide coverage 
primarily through private managed care organiza-
tions (MCOs). Under reform legislation, the same 
four MCOs served both Medicaid and CommCare be-
neficiaries through June 2009, when the Connector 
gained the ability to contract with additional MCOs.   
Individual mandate 
• All adults in Massachusetts are legally required to 
have health insurance, unless they cannot afford it.  
• Children are not subject to the mandate. 
• The mandate is enforced through the state income 
tax system. However, the mandate is not enforced 
against adults with incomes at or below 150 percent 
FPL.6  
Uncompensated care 
• Before the 2006 reform legislation, the state ran an 
Uncompensated Care Pool (UCP) for low-income un-
insured patients ineligible for subsidized coverage. 
The UCP reimbursed both hospitals and community 
health centers throughout Massachusetts.   
• To help finance the state’s coverage expansion, the 
UCP was substantially reduced in size and scope. 
The UCP has been replaced by a similar program, 
the Health Safety Net (HSN), which continues to pay 
for uncompensated care, albeit subject to stricter 
limits.  
Key dates in implementing reform 
• April 2006: Governor Romney signs Chapter 58 of 
the Acts of 2006, the reform legislation, into law. 
• October 2006: CommCare begins enrolling eligible 
individuals with incomes at or below 100 percent 
FPL. They receive premium-free coverage. 
• January 2007: CommCare is open to all eligible indi-
viduals, including those with incomes between 100 
and 300 percent FPL, who are charged premiums on 
a sliding scale.  
• July 2007: Premiums are eliminated for CommCare 
enrollees with incomes between 100 and 150 per-
cent FPL.  
• July 2007: Expanded Medicaid eligibility becomes 
effective.  
• October 1, 2007: The HSN replaces the UCP. 
• December 31, 2007: A consumer’s compliance with 
the individual mandate for 2007 (the mandate’s first 
year) is based on coverage as of this date.  
• April 15, 2008: State income tax returns are due for 
2007. Adults must report their coverage as of De-
cember 31, 2007. The uninsured pay a $219 penalty 
(Cronin 2009).  
• April 15, 2009: State income tax returns are due for 
2008. Each uninsured adult is subject to a penalty 
between $17 and $912, depending on household in-
come and the number of months without coverage.  
  II. CHANGES IN MASSACHUSETTS        INSURANCE COVERAGE SINCE THE 2006 LEGISLATION 
From 2006 to 2008, the proportion of state residents 
without insurance coverage fell from 6.4 percent to 2.6 
percent (Division of Health Care Finance and Policy 
2009).7 More than half of the increase in coverage (56 
percent) took place through Medicaid and CommCare 
(Figure 1).   
Since the end of 2007, CommCare enrollment has been 
the single largest contributor to the increase in health 
coverage (Figure 2).   
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Figure 1. Net increase in the number of Massachusetts residents with health insurance, 
by coverage type: June 30, 2006, to December 31, 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Increases in the number of Massachusetts residents with health insurance, by 
coverage type, since June 30, 2006: Various points in time (thousands of people) 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To learn more about Massachusetts’ implementation of 
health care reform and to investigate how the state suc-
ceeded in enrolling so many low-income uninsured into 
subsidized coverage, we conducted a site visit to Boston 
in July 2009.  During the site visit, evaluators met with 
more than 15 key informants representing a broad 
range of perspectives, including the MassHealth and 
Commonwealth Care programs, public and private pro-
viders (including hospitals and community health cen-
ters), health plan administrators, health care advocates, 
health policy researchers, and community-based out-
reach agencies.  (See Appendix A for a complete list of all 
site visit informants.)  All interviews were conducted 
using structured protocols by evaluation team members 
from the Urban Institute.   To supplement information 
gathered during the site visit, we also drew upon a range 
of published reports and analyses of the state’s pro-
grams.   
  IV. WHAT WORKED?  
To stimulate high participation levels, the state provided 
subsidies that made it affordable for low-income people 
to enroll in comprehensive coverage. A vigorously en-
forced individual mandate also played an important role. 
While these two program characteristics have been 
widely discussed at the national level (e.g., Kaiser Com-
mission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2009), the fol-
lowing factors that helped Massachusetts achieve un-
usually high enrollment into subsidized coverage have 
received little or no attention:  
• Data-driven eligibility for CommCare;  
• A single, integrated eligibility system that ap-
plied information technology to seamlessly 
serve multiple health coverage programs;  
• Grants to community-based organizations 
(CBOs) for public education and enrollment; 
and  
• An intensive public education campaign that 
prominently featured information about the in-
dividual mandate.  
Combined, these strategies had the further benefit of 
lowering the state’s administrative costs. 
Of note, some of the state’s key administrative innova-
tions were introduced years before the 2006 reforms. 
Thus, policymakers planning to replicate similar ap-
proaches nationally or in other states need to take into 
account the time required for successful implementa-
tion. 
Data-driven eligibility and automatic enroll-ment into CommCare 
As officials planned the implementation of Massachu-
setts’ reforms, the state’s Medicaid agency already had 
eligibility records for people who received care through 
the UCP. This included information about household 
income and the reason for Medicaid ineligibility.  Using 
these data, the Medicaid agency identified UCP benefi-
ciaries who appeared eligible for CommCare, based on 
income and categorical ineligibility for Medicaid.8 The 
agency ended their eligibility for the UCP9 and “auto-
converted” them to CommCare, without any need for 
consumers to complete new application forms.10   
This auto-conversion occurred in two waves. From Oc-
tober through December 2006, 48,000 adults11 whose 
incomes were below 100 percent FPL (based on UCP 
records) were found eligible for premium-free Comm-
Care and sent written notices explaining their new cov-
erage status. These individuals were given 14 days to 
select a managed care organization (MCO). Although the 
notice was complex and difficult to understand,12 rough-
ly 45 percent of these auto-converted members chose a 
plan within this brief window, according to state offi-
cials.  
People failing to select an MCO were assigned to a plan 
by the state. The auto-assignment process was based 
primarily on the premium bids submitted by each MCO, 
with the low bidders receiving the highest share of auto-
assigned members; however, in some cases, evidence of 
prior relationships with an MCO’s affiliated providers 
determined the plan in which an individual was 
enrolled. Consumers unhappy with their assignments 
had 60 days in which to change plans, but relatively few 
people requested such changes. By June 2007 (eight 
months into the new program), the nearly 50,000 auto-
converted individuals who received premium-free cov-
erage represented more than 80 percent of all Comm-
Care enrollees. 
A second round of auto-conversion took place from Jan-
uary through March 2007, for approximately 62,000 
people who qualified for CommCare based on UCP data 
showing income between 100 and 300 percent FPL. As 
with the first set of auto-converted members, the second 
group was sent notices explaining their CommCare eligi-
bility. However, because they qualified for coverage that 
required premium payments, they were not enrolled in 
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CommCare until they selected an MCO and paid their 
first month’s premium. By December 2007, nearly 
100,000 out of 158,000 total CommCare enrollees― 
roughly a quarter of all newly insured residents ―were 
former UCP patients (Sullivan 2007), most of whom 
were presumably auto-converted based on UCP data. 
None of the auto-converted had to complete a new ap-
plication form to establish their CommCare eligibility. 
An integrated system that uses information technology to seamlessly determine eligibility for multiple health subsidy programs 
Well before the 2006 reforms, Massachusetts developed 
a system through which a single eligibility system was 
used for the following programs:  
• Medicaid;  
• The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
which is part of Medicaid in Massachusetts;  
• A premium subsidy program for certain low-income 
workers offered employer-sponsored insurance, 
which is also part of the state’s Medicaid program;  
• The UCP; and  
• The Children’s Medical Security Program, a state-
funded program for low-income, immigrant children 
ineligible for federal matching funds under Medicaid 
and CHIP.  
All of these programs employed a single, common appli-
cation form—called the Medical Benefit Request—and 
enrollee eligibility was determined by the state Medicaid 
agency. After passage of the 2006 legislation, this inte-
grated system expanded to include the new CommCare 
and HSN programs. 
With this system, a single statewide Medicaid office de-
termines eligibility for all programs by applying one set 
of income methodologies. Eligibility is determined based 
on a computerized, logic-driven decision tree, rather 
than the state’s previous, traditional approach, which 
required local public welfare staff to manually deter-
mine each applicant’s eligibility case-by-case.13   
From the beneficiary’s perspective, such an integrated 
eligibility system greatly simplifies the enrollment 
process. Only one form must be completed, after which 
the consumer learns which program (if any) will provide 
coverage. By contrast, in many other states that operate 
multiple health coverage programs, consumers may 
need to file applications with one agency after another 
before they finally qualify for the right program. 
The Massachusetts system is further streamlined 
through the state’s “Virtual Gateway.” Operational since 
2004, this system allows deputized, state-trained staff of 
safety net providers and CBOs to fill out and file applica-
tions for consumers over a secure, internet portal. Such 
“application assisters” also obtain consumer signatures 
on necessary forms as well as eligibility documentation 
required by state policy, forwarding completed paper 
documents to the state. In addition, consumers authorize 
providers or CBOs to act as their representatives for eli-
gibility purposes. This means that the application assis-
ter receives a copy of the state’s notices requiring con-
sumers to take various steps to qualify for coverage, 
such as providing a missing item of documentation. This 
facilitates follow-through and helps avoids denials for 
failure to meet procedural requirements.14 
A key part of the Massachusetts system is that a provider 
cannot receive full reimbursement for a patient—under 
any system of coverage—unless an application form is 
successfully completed.15 As a result of this incentive, 
the staff of safety net hospitals and health centers com-
plete forms online for patients, frequently following up 
to make sure all procedural requirements are met, using 
their status as authorized representatives of the patients 
in question. While this requirement was originally in-
itiated to prevent providers from tapping the UCP for 
patients who should have received Medicaid, it has also 
had the effect of increasing enrollment into health cov-
erage under the state’s new, reformed system. According 
to state officials, application forms completed by provid-
ers or CBOs (but not by consumers) and submitted via 
the Virtual Gateway have resulted in more than 50 per-
cent of all Medicaid and CommCare enrollment since the 
enactment of reform legislation.  
Outreach and enrollment grants to CBOs 
For several years before the 2006 legislation, Massachu-
setts extended grants to CBOs—totaling between $2.5 
and $3.5 million annually—to support outreach and 
enrollment efforts.  These grants were supplemented by 
the Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts Founda-
tion. Typically, they were provided to organizations that 
had a long history of working in underserved communi-
ties and that had developed strong trust relationships 
within those communities. Ranging from $5,000 to 
$20,000 per organization,16 these “mini-grants” helped 
develop a cadre of agencies and individuals who were 
knowledgeable about the state’s health coverage pro-
grams, trained in using the Virtual Gateway to complete 
applications on behalf of consumers, and skilled in cultu-
rally and linguistically competent strategies for working 
with diverse, low-income families.  
The mini-grants continued after the enactment of reform 
legislation in 2006.  Recipient organizations obtained 
extensive, ongoing briefings about the reforms’ imple-
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mentation, positioning them to provide accurate infor-
mation to their communities, both proactively and in 
response to questions from consumers. This effort con-
tinues presently through a regular training program, 
with an event held each quarter at five locations 
throughout the state. These briefings are well-attended 
by the staff of providers and CBOs and remain an impor-
tant and ongoing resource in keeping CBOs and provid-
ers informed about the state’s evolving health coverage 
programs. 
As noted above, CBOs joined with safety net hospitals 
and clinics to complete more than 50 percent of all Me-
dicaid and CommCare applications via the Virtual Gate-
way. According to many of our interviewees, CBOs have 
been particularly important in reaching members of 
ethnic minority groups and people with limited English 
proficiency. Consumer advocates suggest that a trusted 
adviser from the consumer’s own community can be 
critically important in giving people the confidence to 
seek coverage.   
Public education (including information about the individual mandate) 
Following passage of health care reform legislation in 
2006, Massachusetts carried out a massive public educa-
tion campaign leading up to the December 2007 imple-
mentation of the individual mandate (Anthony, et al., 
2009; Commonwealth Connector 2008). The state part-
nered with the Boston Red Sox baseball team on televi-
sion, radio, and game time advertisements. CommCare-
contracted health plans, though barred from marketing 
directly to individuals, bought advertisements on buses 
and subway trains and conducted targeted media out-
reach in ethnic communities. CBOs, funded by mini-
grants, also worked with nearby health centers and hos-
pitals to conduct public education at local health fairs, 
churches, and even door-to-door. Bank of America, CVS, 
and other major corporations partnered with the state in 
educating the public. Not only did news outlets cover the 
state’s reforms, the Connector purchased mass media 
advertisements and sent millions of postcards to taxpay-
ers and hundreds of thousands of mailings to employers 
explaining the new law. 
A key part of the state’s public education effort was in-
forming residents about the individual mandate to ob-
tain health coverage. Public opinion research conducted 
before the state’s main public education campaign 
showed that, while most residents were aware of the 
reforms, very few knew even such basic facts as the date 
on which the individual mandate would go into effect 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, et al., 2007).  According to 
the majority of key informants interviewed for this 
study, most low-income residents were unaware that 
they were exempt from the individual mandate.  Rather, 
because of the widespread publicity around the 
mandate, these residents paid keen attention to health 
reform implementation, fearing that inaction or the 
wrong decision could trigger penalties. When state no-
tices about health coverage reached such households, 
consumers frequently reached out to CBOs to learn the 
meaning and implications of such correspondence. As 
explained above, many CBOs could respond to the que-
ries with well-informed, useful advice, since they had 
received both training and funding to conduct outreach, 
public education, and enrollment.  The combination of 
household awareness of the individual mandate and 
CBOs’ readiness to offer guidance contributed signifi-
cantly to 45 percent of auto-converted CommCare enrol-
lees selecting an MCO in late 2006, despite having only 
two weeks in which to choose a health plan.   
Notably, most of the increase in subsidized coverage 
took place among people for whom the mandate was not 
enforced. This included children, who were exempt from 
the mandate, and adults with incomes below 150 per-
cent FPL, who comprised 72.5 percent of CommCare 
members.17 The vast majority of new Medicaid enrollees 
also fell outside the mandate.18 Nevertheless, public 
warnings about the individual mandate were important 
in achieving these enrollment gains, according to infor-
mants. Unlike most state coverage expansions, Massa-
chusetts reforms involved a public education message 
that stressed not just new benefits, but also new penal-
ties. The effectiveness of this message in galvanizing ac-
tion is consistent with behavioral economics research 
showing that people are more likely to take advantage of 
available benefits if the issue is framed as preventing 
loss rather than achieving gain, even if there is no subs-
tantive difference between the two (Bertrand, et al., 
2006). 
Effect on the state’s per capita administrative costs   
The policies described above lowered the per capita ad-
ministrative cost of determining eligibility and enrolling 
people into subsidized coverage, due to several factors:  
• When eligibility was established based on existing 
UCP data, rather than requiring consumers to com-
plete new application forms, the state was spared 
the cost of processing such new forms.   
• When application forms came via the Virtual Gate-
way, safety net providers and CBOs did much of the 
consumer interviewing and key-data entry that, in a 
traditional enrollment system, is handled by public-
ly-funded social-service-agency staff.  
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• Errors were substantially less likely with the Virtual 
Gateway than when consumers completed applica-
tion forms, for two reasons. First, the Virtual Gate-
way was programmed to flag errors and to require 
corrections before an application form could be 
submitted. Second, CBO and provider staff were re-
quired to complete state training before they were 
authorized to use the Virtual Gateway. Because 
these applications contained fewer errors and irre-
gularities than forms completed by consumers, they 
could be processed more rapidly and less expensive-
ly.  
• The Medicaid agency’s shift to a computerized eligi-
bility determination system reduced the operating 
costs of eligibility determination, compared to the 
previous, more labor-intensive model that featured 
substantial exercise of discretion by local welfare 
workers.  
• The use of a single statewide agency to determine 
eligibility for multiple programs achieved econo-
mies of scale. 
Quantified estimates of the magnitude of administrative 
savings were not available for this analysis. However, 
state officials noted the following indicator of increased 
efficiency well before the 2006 reforms: after imple-
menting its revised approach to eligibility determina-
tion, the Medicaid agency more than doubled the num-
ber of annual eligibility determinations while increasing 
staff by less than 10 percent.  
Of course, changing the eligibility determination system 
required up-front investment in information technology 
as well as cultural changes and other transition costs. 
But according to state officials with whom we spoke, the 
administrative cost-savings of more efficient ongoing 
operations exceeded the cost of one-time investments in 
an improved administrative infrastructure.  
 
 V. LIMITATIONS TO THE MASSACHU-SETTS APPROACH 
Despite the state’s accomplishments, the enrollment 
strategies described above have encountered several 
challenges. The first resulted from a combination of un-
expected success and greater need for assistance than 
the state originally anticipated. Because of the data-
driven enrollment into CommCare described above, in 
addition to the state’s underestimate of the number of 
uninsured residents before reforms were implemented, 
early enrollment totals went beyond state expectations. 
As a result, initial subsidy costs likewise exceeded the 
anticipated amounts. However, after several years, 
enrollment and costs remained within the range of orig-
inal projections, according to Massachusetts observers. 
Second, the state’s eligibility system is not entirely inte-
grated and data-driven:   
• One significant health coverage program is out-
side the state’s integrated eligibility system. The 
Medical Security Program (MSP) subsidizes health 
coverage for laid-off workers who receive unem-
ployment insurance and whose incomes are at or 
below 400 percent FPL. Individuals who qualify for 
MSP are ineligible for Medicaid and CommCare. Un-
like the latter subsidy programs, MSP eligibility is 
determined outside Medicaid, by the same agency 
that runs the state’s unemployment insurance pro-
gram, using its own application form. According to 
advocates, consumers can remain uninsured for 
months as they attempt to transition from the state’s 
integrated eligibility system to the MSP program.  
• Medicaid and CommCare have different rules for 
when eligibility starts and stops. While Medicaid 
eligibility can end at any point on the calendar, 
CommCare’s does not begin until the first day of a 
calendar month. As a result, if someone transitions 
from Medicaid to CommCare eligibility because of a 
mid-month change in household circumstances—for 
example, a new job or marriage—the person expe-
riences a gap in coverage, which can last for several 
months if the Connector has to wait for the individ-
ual to select a plan or pay the first month’s premium. 
• Some non-safety-net hospitals do not complete 
application forms for all uninsured patients. Ra-
ther than seek reimbursement from the state in all 
cases, these hospitals bill some of their uninsured 
patients. The resulting charges, some or all of which 
could have been covered by Medicaid, CommCare, or 
the HSN, can be significant (Pryor and Cohen 2009).   
• Coverage can end for procedural reasons at re-
determination, even if members remain eligible. 
After a year on the program, each CommCare mem-
ber’s eligibility is reviewed. The state sends the 
member a form requesting updated demographic, 
income, and employment information. If that form is 
not returned, eligibility ends. This renewal process 
does not include the data-driven eligibility and ap-
plication-assistance components that make initial 
enrollment so user-friendly.19 As a result, many 
CommCare members have their coverage termi-
nated for failure to complete and return these forms 
at redetermination.  During an average quarter be-
tween October 2007 to December 2008, 47,433 
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people joined CommCare, but 37,771 members saw 
their coverage end because of the redetermination 
process (authors’ calculations from Boudreault 
2008 and Commonwealth Connector 2009a). Within 
five months of losing coverage, 21 percent of these 
CommCare members re-enrolled into the program.  
(Commonwealth Connector 2009b).20   
In a sense, the strength of the state’s general enrollment 
and eligibility strategies are illustrated by these gaps. 
Such lapses in coverage result precisely because they 
involve circumstances not governed by the state’s usual 
strategies of (a) applying an integrated eligibility system 
to serve multiple programs and (b) using data-driven 
eligibility and application assistance to avoid the need 
for consumers to fill out forms before they receive cov-
erage.  
  VI. LESSONS FOR NATIONAL AND STATE POLICYMAKERS 
The combination of innovative strategies in Massachu-
setts—namely, data-driven eligibility, a single applica-
tion for all programs that is processed by a single state 
agency, an online portal using provider and community 
resources to enroll consumers, and intensive use of mul-
tiple media tools to convey a message that included 
warnings about the individual mandate—yielded un-
precedented results in lowering the number of unin-
sured. Sadly, most health subsidy programs achieve par-
ticipation levels far below those reached in Massachu-
setts. For example: 
• In bills passed from 1986 through 1990, Congress 
enacted Medicare Savings Programs21 providing 
Medicaid coverage of Medicare premiums and, in 
some cases, deductibles and co-insurance for se-
niors with incomes up to 120 percent FPL (Carpen-
ter 1998). By 2001—over a decade later—fewer 
than one-third of eligible beneficiaries were 
enrolled (Federman, et al., 2005). 
• In 1997, Congress passed the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (recently renamed the Child-
ren’s Health Insurance Program, or CHIP). Despite 
extensive outreach and streamlining of application 
procedures, fully five years after CHIP became effec-
tive only 60 percent of eligible children had enrolled 
(Selden, et al., 2004).22    
• When the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) for 
trade-affected displaced workers and certain early 
retirees was enacted by Congress in 2002, policy-
makers predicted that hundreds of thousands might 
benefit. By 2006, only 28,000 households received 
health coverage through HCTC—an estimated 12 to 
15 percent of the eligible population (Dorn 2008). 
For the first three years of implementation, HCTC 
subsidy payments were less than 30 percent of the 
level forecast when the legislation was enacted 
(Dorn 2006). 
To avoid similar problems with new coverage expan-
sions, federal policymakers crafting national health 
reform (as well as state lawmakers designing coverage 
expansions), could adopt policies similar to those im-
plemented in Massachusetts. 
Federal implications 
For national health reform legislation to achieve its basic 
goal of covering the low-income uninsured, federal law-
makers could consider incorporating the following poli-
cy elements:  
• Data-driven eligibility. No nationwide Uncompen-
sated Care Pool contains data from which uninsured 
individuals can have their eligibility determined for 
an expanded Medicaid program or for new subsidies 
created by national reform legislation. But other 
sources of such data exist. In particular, more than 
six out of seven uninsured individuals (86.3 per-
cent) file federal income tax returns (Dorn 2009). 
Reform legislation could allow the uninsured to use 
tax returns to indicate their lack of insurance cover-
age; such legislation could also authorize the use of 
those returns to determine eligibility for subsidized 
health coverage. If so, tax information could fre-
quently establish eligibility without any need for 
consumers to complete additional application 
forms.23 
• A single, integrated system for applications and 
eligibility determination that applies to all major 
subsidy programs. In each state, one agency could 
determine eligibility for Medicaid, the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and new subsi-
dies enacted through national reform, applying a 
common methodology for calculating income and 
determining enrollment periods, thus avoiding any 
gaps. Within each state, a single application form 
would apply to all three programs.  
The entity determining eligibility could be the Medi-
caid agency,24 if it applies a computerized, logic-
driven eligibility model at the state rather than local 
level.25 State Medicaid agencies would most likely 
require enhanced federal matching funds to cover 
the cost of developing and operating the information 
technology needed under this new approach to eli-
gibility determination.26 If a state chose not to as-
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sume this role, it could be performed by the Social 
Security Administration, which has experience de-
termining income and eligibility for the Supplemen-
tal Security Income (SSI) program.27 Congress could 
require the Secretary of HHS to establish continuous 
and integrated eligibility methodologies for Medica-
id, CHIP, and new subsidies created by reform legis-
lation.    
• A single online application system for all subsidy 
programs within each state, with strong finan-
cial incentives for providers to use that system 
for uninsured patients. The Secretary of HHS could 
establish incentives for providers to complete appli-
cation forms for their patients, develop training 
programs so staff of providers can use the online 
system effectively, and create procedures through 
which patients authorize providers to receive cor-
respondence related to eligibility issues and help the 
families meet requirements needed to enroll and to 
retain coverage.  
• Grants for community-based organizations 
(CBOs) to enroll uninsured individuals into sub-
sidized health coverage. Along with grants would 
come training and access to the online enrollment 
system described above.   
• An extensive public education effort, with partic-
ipation from major national corporations, that in-
cludes information about coverage mandates. 
State implications 
In many states, policies and practices resemble those in 
Massachusetts, but additional refinements may be 
needed to maximize enrollment. For example: 
• With the enactment of Express Lane Eligibility (ELE) 
in the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reau-
thorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), states have great-
ly expanded flexibility under federal law to use data 
from state income tax records and the files of other 
public benefit programs to grant eligibility for child-
ren’s health coverage, notwithstanding differences 
between program methodologies. While this flexibil-
ity is limited to children, states may be able to ob-
tain Medicaid waivers under Section 1115 of the So-
cial Security Act to extend similar strategies to the 
determination of eligibility for parents and other 
adults.  
• Many states have at least partially integrated the 
application processes for Medicaid and separate 
CHIP programs by using a single application form 
for both programs and creating a “single point of en-
try” for reviewing and determining eligibility. Under 
the latter policy, when the CHIP agency denies eligi-
bility because a child appears eligible for Medicaid, 
the file is transferred to the Medicaid agency for fur-
ther processing.  
While such systems represent a major step forward, 
the approach does not reach the full integration 
achieved by Massachusetts. After a family has ful-
filled all procedural requirements for CHIP, if the 
application is transferred to the Medicaid agency, 
the family may need to meet additional procedural 
requirements for the child to receive coverage. With 
two sets of procedural requirements to fulfill (rather 
than a single set), there are more opportunities for 
enrollees to fall between the cracks, so eligible 
children are more likely to remain uninsured.  
This problem would be avoided if a state modified 
its eligibility determination system so that a single 
agency—under federal law, the Medicaid agency—
determined eligibility both for Medicaid and CHIP, 
using the kind of statewide, automated processing 
employed by Massachusetts.  Alternatively, if a state 
chose not to make such a move, it could instead 
work to align its Medicaid and CHIP eligibility rules 
and procedures so that, invisible to the applicant, 
the two programs would work in concert to deter-
mine which program (if any) covers the child, with-
out requiring the completion of any additional ap-
plication forms.  For example, through ELE, a Medi-
caid and CHIP program could each base a child’s eli-
gibility on the other program’s determinations.28  
• As part of implementing CHIPRA, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) are allocat-
ing $80 million in grants to community-based organ-
izations and providers to conduct outreach and 
enrollment for children. This builds on existing state 
efforts (Hill et al. 2004), such as New York’s “Facili-
tated Enrollment” model (Fairbrother, et al., 2004; 
Hill and Hawkes 2002a) and California’s “Certified 
Application Assistance” approach (Jacobson and 
Buchmueller 2007; Sullivan et al. 2005; Hill and 
Hawkes 2002b). To achieve the full benefit of such 
strategies, states need to train and fund the staff of 
providers and CBOs to complete application forms 
rather than just educate consumers about available 
coverage. Ideally, state procedures could encourage 
consumers to appoint these staff to act as their au-
thorized representatives for eligibility purposes, 
thus facilitating necessary follow-through after the 
original application form is filed.  
• States could take additional steps to increase pro-
viders’ involvement in helping consumers enroll.  
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States could follow Massachusetts’ lead by establish-
ing requirements or financial incentives for commu-
nity health centers and hospitals to help their unin-
sured patients complete applications for health cov-
erage. For example, such consumer assistance could 
be required as a condition of licensure, receiving 
Disproportionate Share Hospital payments, or reim-
bursement from Medicaid or health insurance cov-
ering state employees.    
• Several states have developed online application 
forms for Medicaid and CHIP; in some cases, these 
forms serve other populations and programs as 
well. In many states, however, applicants need to 
print out and mail in the forms that are completed 
online. States would achieve administrative efficien-
cies and increase enrollment if data could also be 
submitted online and automatically transferred to 
the state’s eligibility files for further processing. 
Moreover, states could improve the quality of appli-
cations received online by training application assis-
ters and programming the online form to reject ap-
plications that have clear errors.  
Obviously, states can take different approaches to 
achieving coverage results like those realized in Massa-
chusetts. One important aspect of the Massachusetts 
system is that many different administrative features 
combine to maximize enrollment and reduce adminis-
trative costs. However, the strategies applied by Massa-
chusetts deserve serious consideration as potential 
models by states that seek either to reach large numbers 
of uninsured, eligible residents or to lower the operating 
costs of eligibility determination.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Innovative administrative strategies that were essential 
to Massachusetts’ substantial reduction in the number of 
uninsured are surprisingly unknown to health policy 
analysts outside the state. Through interviews with state 
policymakers and stakeholders, we learned that most 
low-income uninsured who enrolled in subsidized cov-
erage did not need to fill out application forms. Instead, 
many qualified for assistance based on data already in 
the state’s possession. Others had application forms 
completed by trained staff of safety-net providers or 
CBOs, using the state’s online enrollment system. Even 
though the state sponsors multiple programs to subsid-
ize health care and to reimburse providers for uncom-
pensated care, a single state agency determines eligibili-
ty for almost all programs, based on a single, common 
application form. By leveraging information technology, 
private-sector involvement in completing application 
forms, and centralized data processing, the state re-
duced the administrative costs of eligibility determina-
tion below the levels characteristic of traditional public 
benefit programs. Finally, a major public education cam-
paign gained consumers’ attention by describing the 
subsidies and individual mandates included in the 
state’s reform.   
If federal or state policymakers wish to enroll a large 
number of eligible uninsured individuals into subsidized 
coverage under proposed reforms, they could learn from 
Massachusetts by designing policies to accomplish the 
following goals: 
• Use available data, whenever possible, to establish 
eligibility, without requiring uninsured consumers 
to file new application forms before receiving cover-
age for which they qualify; 
• Let consumers apply for all possible sources of sub-
sidized health coverage by filing a single application 
form;  
• Use an integrated and seamless system to process 
the single application form and determine eligibility 
for all available subsidies, without requiring the 
consumer to complete additional paperwork; 
• Enlist help from trained staff of providers and CBOs 
by funding them and providing incentives to com-
plete online applications on behalf of consumers and 
to help consumers follow through meeting applica-
ble procedural requirements;  
• Determine eligibility using a single statewide agency 
that employs logic-driven and automated routines to 
identify missing documentation and establish eligi-
bility; and   
• Conduct an intensive public education campaign 
that educates consumers about both new assistance 
and legal requirements to obtain health coverage.    
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 APPENDIX A: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER) 
 
• Stephanie Anthony, Principal Associate, The University of Massachusetts Medical School Center for Law 
and Health Economics 
• Leanne Berge, Vice President of Strategic Planning and Business Development, Network Health  
• Kate Bicego, Consumer Education & Enrollment Manager, Massachusetts Health Care for All 
• Melissa Boudreault, Director of Commonwealth Care Health Plan, Massachusetts Health Insurance Connec-
tor Authority  
• Robin Callahan, Director of Member Policy and Program Development, Office of Medicaid, Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Health and Human Services 
• John Cragin, Senior Director of Commonwealth Care, Boston Medical Center HealthNet Plan 
• Neil Cronin, Policy Analyst/Advocate, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 
• Patricia Edraos, Policy Director, Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers 
• Donna Fox, Vice President of Government Affairs, Cambridge Health Alliance 
• Kaitlyn Kenney, Manager of Policy and Research, Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority  
• Meg Kroeplin, Executive Director, Community Partners, Inc.  
• Members of the ACT!! Health Care for All Coalition Policy and Program Committee 
• Caroline Minkin, Deputy Director for the Health Safety Net 
• Brian Rosman, Research Director, Massachusetts Health Care for All 
• Bob Seifert, Principal Associate, The University of Massachusetts Medical School Center for Law and 
Health Economics 
• Lindsay Tucker, Health Reform Policy Manager, Massachusetts Health Care for All 
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NOTES 
                                                           
1 In 2009, the FPL is $18,310 per year for a three-person household, $22,050 for a household of four, etc.  
2 Under some pending national proposals, subsidies are significantly smaller for both premiums and out-of-pocket costs than is the case in Massa-
chusetts. While important, that subject is outside the parameters of this paper. 
3 This topic could also be important for other states for reasons that go beyond the maximizing enrollment of eligible individuals. Proposed national 
legislation may impose significant new administrative burdens on states. The 2009 House Tri-Committee bill (HR 3200), for example, requires that 
all uninsured must be screened for potential Medicaid eligibility (and enrolled, if they qualify) before their eligibility for other subsidies is assessed. 
As explained below, Massachusetts’ administrative innovations substantially lower the per capita cost of eligibility determination. Such efficiencies 
may be important for other states to replicate if national legislation substantially increases the number of eligibility determinations required of Me-
dicaid agencies. Those efficiencies also provide an important signal to national policymakers that, done right, reforms can slim rather than fatten 
public-sector bureaucracies, even as the number of uninsured declines. 
4 Features of the law not described here include employer responsibilities, insurance reforms, and the Commonwealth Choice program (the state’s 
health insurance exchange, which offers unsubsidized coverage).  
5 The reform legislation made other changes to Medicaid as well. For example, the bill expanded eligibility for certain categories of adult coverage, 
increased Medicaid reimbursement rates, and restored certain adult benefits that had previously been eliminated.  
6 The reason for this exemption is that these adults have access to premium-free CommCare. As a result, they have no financial incentive to delay 
coverage until they need care. In addition, the penalty for uninsurance is set at half the cost of coverage; since CommCare is free to these adults, no 
penalty applies.   
7 Survey methodologies changed from 2006 to 2008, so results may not be fully comparable. However, other surveys conducted in 2006, 2007, and 
2008 that applied consistent methodologies confirm the magnitude of the decline in uninsurance (Long and Stockley 2009).   
8 Some people fall outside Medicaid’s eligibility categories and so do not qualify, no matter how low their income. 
9 For each auto-converted member, the UCP continued to be available for 90 days after eligibility for CommCare was established. 
10 This conversion took place even though, with some individuals, eligibility data for the UCP had not been updated for over a year. This did not pose 
a problem for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), because these enrollees’ eligibility would be redetermined a year after their 
CommCare enrollment. This issue received a small amount of attention as the state and CMS negotiated the terms of the state’s 2006 Medicaid waiver 
under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act.  
11 The number of  auto-converted individuals in each category (up to 100 percent FPL and above 100 percent FPL) is taken from the Connector’s 
estimate of the number of UCP members  who qualified for CommCare  (Commonwealth Connector 2007).   
12 The notice of CommCare eligibility was contained in the middle of a lengthy UCP eligibility notice, written in technical language, the main nominal 
topic of which was the termination of UCP eligibility and the consumer’s resulting appeal rights. 
13 Each hospital and community health center determined eligibility for the UCP, applying state standards. 
14 The state is planning to implement a “public facing” Virtual Gateway through which consumers can complete applications online.  
15 If such a form is not filled out, the only source of compensation is the “medical hardship” program, which pays uncompensated care costs once 
expenses have exceeded a specified percentage of the patient’s income; the percentage varies based on the applicable FPL. 114.6 CMR §13.05.  
16 Some grants were for significantly larger amounts. The recipients were responsible for subcontracting with and providing training and technical 
support to multiple local agencies.  
17 Authors’ calculations from Commonwealth Connector 2009a. 
18 Medicaid children are exempt from the mandate, and most adults have incomes below 150 percent FPL. However, a small number of adults under 
age 65 receive Medicaid even though their incomes exceed this threshold. For example, these adults may qualify because of pregnancy or HIV/AIDS, 
for which eligibility extends to 200 percent FPL, a diagnosis of  breast or cervical cancer, which confers eligibility up to 250 percent FPL, and em-
ployment at certain companies for which Medicaid provides premium subsidies up to 300 percent FPL (Seifert 2008).  
19 As we go to press, CommCare administrators are working to improve the redetermination process by including a “CommCare-specific” insert with 
redetermination paperwork; pre-populating redetermination forms with information available to the state; and permitting consumers to complete 
forms for both enrollment and renewal on–line (Commonwealth Connector 2009b).  
20 The latter estimate is for February 2008 through March 2009. 
21 At the time, the eligibility categories were known as Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs) or Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries 
(SLMBs).  
22 By 2004-2005, participation rates reached 80 percent. Authors’ calculations, Hudson and Selden 2007.  
23 For a relatively detailed discussion of how such eligibility could be structured, see Dorn 2009.  
24 If eligibility were to be determined instead by private contractors, as takes place under many CHIP programs, it may prove challenging to maintain 
high performance with strong institutional memory over time. State competitive bidding laws often require selecting the least costly contractor. 
After the initial contract ends, that standard can require a transition to a new contractor, which can cause substantial dislocation that harms benefi-
ciaries as a new contractor comes up to speed.   
25 Determining eligibility at the county level, as takes place in several states, makes it substantially more difficult to implement major reforms. It also 
reduces the likelihood of adherence to data security and privacy safeguards, which are critically important under the data-based approach described 
here. 
26 One possible approach would extend the current Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) enhanced match to eligibility improvements 
needed to carry out the kind of expanded responsibility described in the text. Such match pays 90 percent of initial IT development and 75 percent of 
operating costs. Under a regulation dating back to the 1970s, MMIS match is available only for systems that process provider claims, not IT that de-
termines eligibility. 42 CFR 433.112(c) and 42 CFR 433.111(b)(3). 
27 Problems during early implementation may be lessened if administrative duties are assigned to agencies that currently have similar responsibili-
ties. For this reason, we do not suggest vesting health insurance exchanges with the responsibility for determining subsidy eligibility. Such exchanges 
will bear a great enough burden without assuming the complex duties involved in determining eligibility for subsidies.   
28 New Social Security Act § 1902(e)(13)(F)(ii)(I)(cc) and (dd) [42 U.S.C. 1396a(e)(13) (F)(ii)(I)(cc) and (dd)], added by CHIPRA Section 203(a). 
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